The Wall Street Journal
The Tehran-Caracas Axis
Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are more than just
pen pals.
BY MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY
With Iranian nuclear aspirations gaining
notice, it's worth directing attention to the growing relationship between
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez. The
Reagan administration repulsed Soviet efforts to set up camp in Central
America. Iranian designs on Venezuela perhaps deserve similar U.S. attention.
The warmth and moral support between
Ahmadinejad and Chávez is very public. The two tyrants are a lot more than just
pen pals. Venezuela has made it clear that it backs Iran's nuclear ambitions
and embraces the mullahs' hateful anti-Semitism. What remains more speculative
is just how far along Iran is in putting down roots in Venezuela.
In September, when the International Atomic
Energy Agency offered a resolution condemning Iran for its "many failures
and breaches of its obligations to comply" with its treaty commitments,
Venezuela was the only country that voted "no." Ahmadinejad
congratulated the Venezuelan government, calling the vote "brave and
judicious."
Three months later, in a Christmas Eve TV
broadcast, Chávez declared that "minorities, the descendants of those who
crucified Christ, have taken over the riches of the world." That ugly
anti-Semitic swipe was of a piece with an insidious assault over the past
several years on the country's Jewish community. In 2004, heavily armed Chávez
commandos raided a Caracas Jewish school, terrifying children and parents. The
government's claim that it had reason to believe that the school was storing
arms was never supported. A more reasonable explanation is that the raid was
part of the Chávez political strategy of fomenting class hatred--an agenda that
finds a vulnerable target in the country's Jewish minority--and as a way to
show Tehran that Venezuela is on board. Ahmadinejad rivals Hitler in his hatred
for the Jewish people.
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It's tough to tell whether
Chávez is a committed bigot or whether his anti-Semitism and embrace of the
mullahs are simply a part of his calculated efforts to annoy the Yanquis. But
it doesn't make much difference. The end result is that the Iranian connection
introduces a new element of instability into Latin America.
In his efforts to provoke the U.S., the
Venezuelan no doubt hopes that saber rattling against imperialismo can
stir up nationalist sentiment and save his floundering regime. That view argues
that the U.S. would do best to ignore him, but it's not easy to ignore a Latin
leader who seems intent on forging stronger ties with two of the worst enemies
of the U.S., Ahmadinejad and Fidel Castro.
That Chávez is making a hash of the Venezuelan
economy while he courts international notoriety is no secret. There are
shortages of foodstuffs that are abundant even in other poor countries. Milk,
flour for the national delight known as arepas, and sugar are in short
supply. Coffee is scarce because roasters say government controls have set the
price below costs, forcing them to eat losses. The Chávez response last week
was a threat to nationalize the industry.
Property rights are being abolished. Last
week, authorities invaded numerous "unoccupied" apartments in Caracas
to hand them over to party faithful, part of a wider scheme to
"equalize" life for Venezuelans.
A bridge collapse earlier this month on the
main artery linking Caracas to the country's largest airport, seaport and an
enormous bedroom community is seen as a microcosm of the country's failing
infrastructure. Aside from the damage to commerce, it has caused great
difficulties for the estimated 100,000 commuters who live on the coast, Robert
Bottome, editor of the newsletter Veneconomy, told me from Caracas on
Wednesday. The collapse diverted all this traffic to an old two-lane road with
hairpin turns and more than 300 curves. It is now handling car traffic during
the day and commercial traffic at night, with predictable backups.
With Venezuelan oil fields experiencing an
annual depletion rate on the order of 25% and little government reinvestment in
the sector, similar infrastructure problems are looming in oil. In November,
Goldman Sachs emerging markets research commented on a fire at a "major refinery
complex" in which 20 workers were injured: "In recent months there
has been a string of accidents and other disruptions [of] oil infrastructure,
which oil experts attribute to inadequate investment in maintenance and lack of
technical expertise to run complex oil refining and exploration
operations."
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Chávez is notably
nonchalant about all this, as if the health of the economy is the last thing on
his mind. His foreign affiliations are more important to him. The Iranian news
agency MEHR said last year that the two countries have signed contracts valued
at more than $1 billion. In sum, Iranians, presiding over an economy that is
itself crumbling into disrepair, are going to build Venezuela 10,000
residential units and a batch of manufacturing plants, if MEHR can be believed.
Chávez reportedly says these deals--presumably financed with revenues that
might be better employed repairing the vital bridge--include the transfer of
"technology" from Iran and the importation of Iranian "professionals"
to support the efforts.
Details on the Iranian
"factories"--beyond a high-profile tractor producer and a widely
publicized cement factory--remain sketchy. But what is clear is that the
importation of state agents from Hugo-friendly dictatorships hasn't been a
positive experience for Venezuelans. Imported Cubans are now applying their
"skills" in intelligence and state security networks to the detriment
of Venezuelan liberty. It is doubtful that the growing presence of Iranians in
"factories" across Venezuela is about boosting plastic widget output.
The U.S. intelligence agencies would do well to make a greater effort to find
out exactly what projects the Chávez-Ahmadinejad duo really have in mind.
Almost certainly, they are up to no good.
Ms. O'Grady edits the Americas column, which
appears Fridays in The Wall Street Journal.